Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure in California: Consent Notes and by Carniato, John J., Jr.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 3 | Number 2 Article 10
1-1-1963
Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure in
California: Consent Notes and
John J. Carniato Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
John J. Carniato Jr., Comment, Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure in California: Consent Notes and, 3 Santa Clara Lawyer 180
(1963).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss2/10
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CALIFORNIA: CONSENT.
As the volume of cases involving the legality of search and seizure has become more
staggering, the question of whether the evidence obtained in a search is admissible
appears as the overriding issue in many criminal cases. The solution to the problem, how-
ever, is clouded by the necessities of law enforcement and a few cases of over-zealous
police work. In many of these cases the prosecution relies on the fact that the search
was conducted with the voluntary consent of the accused. For it is not necessary to
show that the search was reasonable as incident to a proper arrest when the search was
made with the defendant's consent.'
The question of whether consent has been given to a search and seizure is a close
one. It is the purpose of this note to briefly demonstrate the closeness of the question
and under what circumstances the courts have felt that sufficient consent has been given.
A survey of the cases reveals three main problem areas: (1) the voluntary character
of the consent to a search, (2) where consent has been given by one other than the
defendant, and (3) the purpose of the search as related to the extent of the consent
given.
In order for consent to vitiate an otherwise unreasonable search, the consent must be
given voluntarily. 2 The question of voluntariness frequently arises when there is a doubt
whether the consent was given freely or in response either to an express or implied
assertion of authority. In People'v. Michael,3 three police officers, who identified them-
selves as such, were admitted to the defendant's home by her mother and, pursuant to
their query whether she had any narcotics, defendant and her mother produced narcotics
and hypodermic equipment, whereupon the defendant was arrested. The court, taking
into consideration that the appearance of four officers at the door may be a disturbing
experience to a distraught or timid woman, nevertheless stated that to hold as a matter
of law that the mother's consent was given in response to an unlawful assertion of author-
ity would interfere with a policeman's reasonable performance of his duty. Furthermore
the court held that this question of voluntary consent was a question of fact for the trial
court.
Another common situation in which the question of voluntariness is frequently liti-
gated occurs when the defendant is under arrest and in actual physical custody when
the consent is obtained by the searching officers. The courts have generally held that
arrest, in itself, is not such an assertion of authority as to make an otherwise free and
valid consent involuntary.4 However, in People v. Wilson,5 the accused was arrested for
vagrancy when he was actually suspected of bookmaking. After the arrest the officers
obtained permission to search the defendant's automobile. The court held that the de-
fendant had been improperly arrested; that consent given after a person has been im-
properly arrested, and without informing him of his legal right to refuse, was not real
or proper consent.
Not only can the necessary voluntary consent be given verbally, but the courts are
agreed that certain conduct may be sufficient to convey the necessary expression of
consent to the searching officers. 6 In People v. Smyre,7 the defendant opened the door
three-quarters of the way and then stepped back and set down on a bed. The court held
that these actions constituted sufficient consent.
Often, either because the suspect has fled, or has been arrested, the consent to search
' People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955). See also People v. Melody, 164 Cal.
App.2d 728, 331 P.2d 72 (1958).
People v. McGree, 196 Cal.App.2d 458, 16 Cal.Rptr. 625 (1961).
'45 Cal.2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
'People v. Luyan, 141 Cal.App.2d 143, 296 P.2d 93 (1956).
'145 Cal.App.2d 1,301 P.2d 974 (1956).
O People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956). The defendant was suspected of using
narcotics. When the officers knocked on the door, the defendant opened the door and. walked back
into the center of the room. The court found that this was sufficient consent to validate any possible
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the defendant's automobile (or other property) is obtained from some other person. If
such other person has apparent authority, consents to entry, and the entry is made in
good faith, it is not unlawful.8 The courts have held that even consent given by a de-
fendant's mistress is sufficient to authorize a valid and legal search.9
In People v. Hughes ° the court discussed a situation in which the husband was in
bed and asleep when the wife permitted officers to enter and search their premises. The
defendant, in claiming that the wife's consent was insufficient, relied on People v.
Carter," where the court discussed the extent of the wife's authority to permit people
to enter the family home in the absence of the husband. The court created the implica-
tion that she has no such authority when the husband is home. The Hughes court, how-
ever, declared this implication to be dicta and stated that in a fact situation similar to
that in Carter a finding of lack of consent might be upheld. The court took the view
that since the wife had apparent authority and control of the house, her consent was
sufficient.
The courts have also held that anyone in joint occupancy of the premises may give
consent to search which is binding upon the co-tenant. 12 However, there is no reasonable
basis for a general assumption that every person who happens to be in the house has
authority to give permission to do acts on the premises which the searching officers
could not legally do without sufficient consent.
1
" I
It is clear that if the defendant is a tenant of an apartment house, as distinguished
from a private home there must be evidence to give the officer reason to believe that
the manager or other person has authority to consent to the officer's entry. 14
A difficult question arises when the officers are given consent to search for one pur-
pose, and discover evidence of a different nature than that ostensibly sought. In People
v. Roberts15 officers discovered stolen property in the defendant's apartment. The de-
fendant objected to the admission into evidence of the seized property, claiming that the
search warrant was issued on evidence which was the product of an illegal search. The
illegal search complained of took place when the officers came to question the suspect.
As they stood outside the apartment, they heard moans and other sounds which indicated
that someone was in distress in the apartment. The manager of the apartment house let
the officers into the defendant's room. While the officers searched for the injured person,
one of the policemen picked up a radio, checked the serial number and found it to be
stolen property. It was upon this evidence that the subsequent search warrant was
issued.
Even though there was no injured person inside the apartment, the court stated that
while the officers knew the manager did not have the authority to let them into the
apartment, they did have the right to go into the rooms to search for a wounded or
injured person. While stating that when the right to search is obtained ostensibly for
one purpose, it may not be used in reality for another, the court held that the officers
unreasonable search. See also People v. Baca, 198 Cal.App.2d 391, 17 Cal.Rptr. 779 (1962); People
v. Holland, 148 Cal.App.2d 933, 307 P.2d 703 (1957).
7 164 Cal.App.2d 833, 330 P.2d 67 (1958).
8 People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal.2d 68, 292 P.2d 513 (1956). Evidence was obtained in a murder
trial through a search of the defendant's room without a search warrant. Permission for the search was
given by the caretaker and the owner of the property.
9 People v. Howard, 166 Cal.App.2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1959). See also People v. Cunningham,
188 Cal.App.2d 606, 10 Cal.Rptr. 604 (1961); and People v. Smith, 183 Cal.App.2d 670, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1960) in which the court held that the defendant's mistress had sufficient apparent control
and possession of the premises to give a valid consent which was binding on the defendant.
10 183 Cal.App.2d 107, 6 Cal.Rptr. 643 (1960).
1148 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
15 People v. Ransome, 180 Cal.App.2d 140, 4 Cal.Rptr. 347 (1960). See also People v. Silva, 140
Cal.App.2d 791, 296 P.2d 942 (1956).13 People v. Carswell, 149 Cal.App.2d 395, 308 P.2d 852 (1957).
14 People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
15 47 Cal.2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
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did not have to blind themselves to what was in plain sight simply because it was dis-
connected with the purpose for which they entered.' 6
Thus it has been held that under certain circumstances, evidence obtained while
"frisking" a suspect is admissible as obtained in a reasonable search. 17 The courts hold
that an officer has the right to protect himself from attack with a hidden weapon, and
that other evidence obtained while conducting such a search is admissible.1 8 It has also
been held that evidence found while disrobing a patient in a hospital, preparatory to
medical treatment, is admissible.19
From this brief survey of the cases, certain general principles can be formulated
which, though easy to state, are sometimes difficult to apply in the particular case. The
courts have continued to hold that the consent must be voluntary as opposed to submis-
sion to authority. And they have established rules as to who, other than the defendant,
may give a binding consent. It would seem, however, that in many of the cases con-
sidered, the courts have placed a great temptation in the way of law enforcement
officials. For in their zeal to protect the public, police officers may be tempted to invent
facts allowing them to search defendants' premises without all of the safeguards laid
down by the courts and the constitution.
John J. Carniato, Jr.
16 Id. at 379, 303 P.2d at 723.
17 People v. Collier, 169 Cal.App.2d 12, 336 P.2d 582 (1959). See also People v. Okamota, 177
Cal.App.2d 407, 2 Cal.Rptr. 182 (1960); People v. Wright, 153 Cal.App.2d 35, 313 P.2d 868
(1957).
18 People v. Collier, supra note 17.
People v. Gonzales, 182 Cal.App.2d 276, 5 Cal.Rptr. 920 (1960).
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